Tax morale and tax evasion by Méder, Zsombor Z. et al.
CORVINUS UNIVERSITY OF BUDAPEST
DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Fövám tér 8., 1093 Budapest, Hungary
Phone: (+36-1) 482-5541, 482-5155
Fax: (+36-1) 482-5029  
Email of corresponding author: janos.vincze@uni-corvinus.hu
Website: http://web.uni-corvinus.hu/matkg
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER 
2012 / 2 
 
TAX MORALE AND TAX EVASION: 
SOCIAL PREFERENCES AND BOUNDED RATIONALITY 
 
Zsombor Z. Méder, András Simonovits & János Vincze 
8 June 2012 
 
 
 
 
János Vincze acknowledges financial support from Hungarian research grant TÁMOP 4.2.2/B-10/1-2010-0023. 
Tax Morale and Tax Evasion:
Social Preferences and Bounded Rationality
Zsombor Z. Me´dera, Andra´s Simonovitsb,c,d, Ja´nos Vinczeb,e
aMaastricht University, Department of Economics, The Netherlands
bInstitute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
cInstitute of Mathematics, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary
d Department of Economics, Central European University, Hungary
eCorvinus University of Budapest, Hungary
Abstract
We study a family of models of tax evasion, where a flat-rate tax finances only the provision of public goods, neglecting
audits and wage dierences. We focus on the comparison of twomodeling approaches. The first is based on optimizing
agents, who are endowed with social preferences, their utility being the sum of private consumption and moral utility.
The second approach involves agents acting according to simple heuristics. We find that while we encounter the
traditionally shaped Laer-curve in the optimizing model, the heuristics models exhibit (linearly) increasing Laer-
curves. This dierence is related to a peculiar type of behavior emerging within the heuristics based approach: a
number of agents lurk in a moral state of limbo, alternating between altruism and selfishness.
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JEL classification: H26
PsycINFO classification: 3020
1. Introduction
When we pay taxes we cooperate with our fellow citizens. This cooperation may lead to outcomes that, for all
of us, are superior to those resulting from non-taxation, but in order to achieve these outcomes we have to incur im-
mediate costs, as taxation amounts to shrinking our individual budget set. Cooperation has been one of the favorite
problems of researchers in several disciplines. Economists traditionally approached the issue using tools borrowed
from non-cooperative game theory, finding that many ideas can be shared with biologists who introduced evolutionary
games as a closely related field. Later on, certain experimental games implicated psychology as well, and cooperation
became interwoven with altruism and reciprocity, becoming a subject of behavioral economics. In experimental ulti-
matum, dictator or trust games, selfish individual rationality is consistently refuted, and some sort of “social behavior”
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prevails. Though in iterated experiments of public goods games the level of apparent benevolence is diminishing, it
is not obvious whether this is due to learning or dissatisfaction with others’ asocial behavior, see Fehr and Camerer
(2004). It seems that people have other motives than maximizing their own incomes, since these experiments have
such a simple structure that it is very unlikely that cognitive limitations could explain the altruism exhibited by par-
ticipants. The experimental findings corroborate the important role of tax morale, including the impact of social
relationships, as moral behavior may not be independent of the observation of our neighbors’ acts, see Henrich et al.
(2004), Janssen and Ahn (2003), Cason et al. (2002).
The precise interpretations of altruism and reciprocity is a matter of controversy. Related phenomena have been
given dierent names (e.g. reciprocal altruism, strong reciprocity). We may call it the “social animal” view of human-
ity, according to which people are bound to cooperate, being led by a disposition to confer material advantages onto
others, without hoping for any immediate reward, or even without the sight of compensation. This is a disposition
that may be deactivated if not reciprocated. The objects of our altruism can become thought of as unworthy to our
generosity. It is even possible that non-cooperators incite our spite, and we wish to make them harm, even if this
entails doing harm to ourselves.1
The psychological literature is split on the issue along several dimensions: whether reciprocity is the result of
group or individual selection (see Gintis et al. (2008)), whether reciprocity is an adaptation or a by-product of an
ancient adaptation that has become obsolete by today (Cosmides and Tooby (1997)). Here we focus on another point
of contention: how to model reciprocity? Gintis et al. (2008) expresses the view that reciprocity can be handled in the
framework of the beliefs, preferences and constraints model of human choice. (Examples include Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) and Rabin (1993). However, there are some sharply dierent opinions on this issue. Citing Selten, Hertwig and
Herzog (2009) refers to this social preference approach as “repair work”. Gigerenzer and Selten (2002) puts forward
the thesis that human social intelligence can be modeled in terms of boundedly rational fast and frugal heuristics,
following Simon (1956). In the study of reciprocity the heuristics approach has been applied, for instance, in Delton
et al. (2011).
In this paper we ask whether the social preference and the heuristics approaches can lead to dierent conclusions.
If the answer is “yes”, this may indicate a way to discriminate between the two modeling philosophies. We model
reciprocity in a particular guise, taxation without enforcement. Our main result is that the two approaches produce
some salient qualitative asymmetries.
Why is the taxation problem special? There is certainly no “instinct to pay taxes”. To pay or not to pay taxes is a
relatively recent problem for humankind, exhibiting certain features that distinguish it from other kinds of cooperation.
1“By strong reciprocity we mean a propensity, in the context of a shared social task, to cooperate with others similarly disposed, even at personal
cost, and a willingness to punish those who violate cooperative norms, even when punishing is personally costly.” Gintis et al. (2008)
2
A big problem with enforcing taxation is the ineectiveness of individually punishing cheating. For the isolated
individual, the only way to punish is to stop paying taxes, which has negligible eects on cheaters and non-cheaters
alike. In the classical theory of taxation based on individual rationality, only centralized detection cum punishment
of cheaters can make us comply. With instinctive altruism, taxes may be paid without persecuting cheaters, and in
this paper we make the (unrealistic) assumption that noncompliance is never punished by society. This will help us
dierentiate between the two modeling approaches.
Models of tax compliance are closely related to public good provision problems. The taxation problem is dierent
from other public good provision situations, because of the presence of a large number of mostly anonymously inter-
acting agents. If public monitoring is costly, then it is a nontrivial issue to determine optimal audit probabilities and
penalty schemes. The first mathematical analyses of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974), modeled
tax evasion as a gamble: for a given audit probability and a penalty proportional to the evaded tax, what share of their
incomes do risk averse individuals report, when they have merely self-regarding preferences? Subsequent studies have
discovered that the actual probability of audits and the penalty rate are insucient to explain why citizens of some
societies pay income taxes to such a high extent they do, again on the tacit assumption of self-regarding preferences.
Invoking some sort of social preferences is not uncommon in the tax evasion literature. This amounted to the
introduction of tax morale, as in Frey andWeck-Hannemann (1984), and more recently in Lago-Penas and Lago-Penas
(2010). To study the role of social preferences in isolation, Simonovits (2010) took tax morale as given, assumed a
utility function which took into account the utility derived from the act of reporting along the utility derived from
personal consumption. Taxes finance income redistribution as well as provision of public goods. The optimal report
achieves a balance between the larger consumption due to lower report and the moral utility arising from higher report.
The paper finds that higher tax morale induces greater income redistribution and net tax, financing a higher level of
public expenditures. Traxler (2010) used a more refined model, making the moral utility dependent on the share of
norm-followers: the moral utility from reporting is inversely related to the number of cheaters. He also incorporated
the auditing and penalizing block from Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Now the existence of an equilibrium becomes
an intricate problem, moreover, the case of multiple equilibria cannot be ruled out.
Another branch of the literature applied the heuristics approach to taxation problems, see Bloomquist (2006) or
Szab et al. (2009). These attempts are usually classified as agent-based models. Hokamp and Pickhardt (2010) is
perhaps the most influential recent example. It uses four types of actors: rational agents, the equivalents of tradi-
tional selfish utility maximizers; moralists, who pay all their dues; erratics, who make errors, allowing for income
overreporting; and emulators, who follow the behavior of their neighbors within a social network. Similar models are
oered by Antunes et al. (2006), Frey and Torgler (2007) and Prinz (2010). Common to these models is that they do
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not assume social preferences as such. Agents are equipped with simple strategies (behavioral rules), and sometimes
change their behavior by adopting strategies that perform better in terms of “individual fitness”. These models usually
focus on the problem of punishing tax evaders.
This paper analyzes tax evasion in the complete absence of audits and fines, similar too Simonovits (2010), but
unlike most of papers cited above. Thus we can reformulate our main question as follows: what are the implications
of dierent views on human behavior (social preferences or heuristics) in the Utopian world where nobody is forced
to contribute to social funds? For the sake of simplicity, we neglect wage dierences, as well as income redistribution,
taxes finance the provision of public goods. Our tax system works with a flat rate without cash-back.
In the first set of models (Models A and B) agents maximize utility functions with social preferences. People
are concerned with their own consumption, feel happiness if they contribute to the welfare of others, but became
asocial if experience that their fellow-citizens are cheating. In model A, every worker knows the society’s average
previous reported income. In model B every worker has his own time-invariant neighborhood and he is able to
observe his neighbors’ previous tax reports. In both cases we investigate the existence of an equilibrium or multiple
equilibria, and their stability. Under sensible parameterizations we encounter the traditional Laer-curve, tax revenue
first increases then decreases as the tax rate rises.
In our heuristics (or agent-) based model (model C), income reporting is dichotomous, and agents make cue-
induced decisions. They are willing to pay taxes, except when one or two cues indicate that the rest of society is
not worthy of their generosity. These two cues are: feeling materially dissatisfied, and observing that the majority of
their neighbors cheat. In such an environment these cues can be considered as the best thing to base reciprocation on.
Material dissatisfaction is a (noisy) signal of large scale tax evasion, and by observing his neighbors one can judge the
behavior of the whole society, though admittedly with a large sampling error. We allow people to dier in how they
interpret these cues. In this model we tried to find parameters to replicate at least qualitatively the results obtained in
the first two models. However, we have not been able to find non-monotonic Laer-curves. This is the main result of
the paper, and we interpret it as a possible way to discriminate between the two approaches to reciprocal altruism.
Laer-curves have a natural shape in traditional economic models. At a tax rate of zero tax revenue is zero. too.
At a tax rate of 1 self-regarding people do not work – or hide their income if they can – and tax revenue is again nil.
By continuity there must be an interior tax rate where tax revenue is maximized. With reasonable social preferences in
our social preferences model this familiar shape reappears, but with some interesting features. In our heuristics model,
however, we have not been able to reproduce this. Though as the tax rate increases more and more agents opt for tax
evasion, the increase in the number of evaders does not counterweight the eect of a larger tax rate. It is not impossible
of course that one can set up a dierent model in the vein of our heuristics model where this result is overturned, but
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it is perhaps significant that we did not make assumptions deliberately in order to have a monotonically increasing
Laer-curve. What is the reason for this dierence between the social preferences and heuristics approaches? We
discover a type of agents lurking in an ethical state of limbo, dissatisfied with either paying or avoiding taxes. This
kind of behavior can only arise in the heuristics approach. The existence of such agents diminishes the negative eect
of tax rates on non-compliance, leading to a monotonic Laer-curve within model C.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents models A and B, based on social preferences. The
heuristics-based model C and simulation is presented in Section 3. The final section concludes.
2. Social preferences
This section formalizes the social preference approach. Here individuals maximize their morale-dependent utility
functions. We consider two cases: the individual utility functions depend on the previous period income reports of the
whole population or only on the average of neighbors.
2.1. Model A: Full observation
Let the number of workers be I. We will index workers as i = 1; 2; : : : ; I and periods (say years) as t = 0; 1; 2; : : : .
We assume that every worker earns the same amount, unity: w = 1. Thus, there is no reason for income redistribution
and the tax only finances the provision of public goods.
Let mi be worker i’s exogenous tax morale, let vi;t be his income report in period t, vm  vi;t  1, where vm is
the minimal report, 0  vm < 1. It is assumed that although the government knows that everybody earns a unity, it
tolerates underreporting, insisting only on a minimal report.
In period t the average reported wage is equal to
v¯t =
PI
i=1 vi;t
I
:
Let  be a real number between 0 and 1, the tax rate. Let ci;t denote worker i’s consumption: ci;t = 1   vi;t. His
traditional utility function is then u(ci;t). Let the moral utility function be z(vi;t;mi; v¯t 1), which has three components:
utility derived from his own report vi;t, his exogenous morale2 mi and the previous average reported income v¯t 1.
Finally let the per capita public expenditure be Xt, i.e. Xt = v¯t, whose individual utility is q(Xt).
Let us assume that u(), z(; ; ) and q() are strictly increasing and strictly concave function. Worker i’s utility is
the sum of three terms:
Ui;t = u(ci;t) + z(vi;t;mi; v¯t 1) + q(Xt):
2The exogenous tax morale has no direct economic meaning, it can only be inferred from indirect observations.
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When maximizing Ui, the worker neglects the third term, since the eect of his decision on it is only marginal. In
other words, in period t worker i reports such an income which maximizes his narrow utility:
Ui;t(vi;t) = u(1   vi;t) + z(vi;t;mi; v¯t 1) ! max :
In case of interior optimum,
Ui;t0(vi;t) =  u0(1   vi;t) + z01(vi;t;mi; v¯t 1) = 0;
where z01 is the partial derivative of function z with respect to the first variable.
In case of a corner solution, either
vi;t = vm if Ui;t0(vm) =  u0(1   vm) + z01(vm;mi; v¯t 1) < 0;
or
vi;t = 1 if Ui;t0(1) =  u0(1   ) + z01(1;mi; v¯t 1) > 0:
The system’s initial state is v0 = (v1;0; : : : ; vI;0). The system is in an equilibrium vo = (vo1; : : : ; v
o
I ) if starting the
system from it, the system remains there. The system is called asymptotically stable if (i) for any real " > 0, there
exists another real  > 0, such that if the initial state is in the -neighborhood of the equilibrium, it stays in the
"-neighborhood of the equilibrium and (ii) vi;t asymptotically converges to voi .
We need to apply parameterized rather than general utility functions, c.f. Simonovits (2010):
ui(ci;t) = log ci;t; z(vi;t;mi; v¯t 1) = v¯t 1mi(log vi;t   vi;t); q(Xt) = ! log Xt;
where ! > 0 is the eciency parameter of the public expenditures. Note that the first and second factors of z are
endogenous and exogenous tax morales, while the third factor in parantheses increases with reported income vi;t for
vi;t < 1 and decreases otherwise: there is no moral urge to overreport income.
Then the implicit dierence equation of the optimal report is
  
1   vi;t + v¯t 1mi
 
1
vi;t
  1
!
= 0; i = 1; 2; : : : ; I:
Solving for vt, we get:
vt =
 + mi( + 1)vt 1  
q
[ + mi( + 1)vt 1]2   4m2i v2t 1
2mivt 1
:
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The equation of the equilibrium for the symmetric case mi = m is
 
1   vo + v
om
 
1
vo
  1
!
= 0:
Then co = 1   vo, zo = vom log vo and q(Xo) = ! log(vo).
It can be shown that the symmetric equilibrium of reports is the lower root of a quadratic equation:
vo =
1 +    p(1   )2 + 42=m
2
:
It is easy to see that the equilibrium report is an increasing function of the exogenous morale. It is more dicult
to prove that the equilibrium report is a decreasing function of the tax rate.
When does an equilibrium exist? If vm  vo  1, i.e.
  
1   vmm + vmm
 
1
vm
  1
!
> 0 , m > 
(1   vm)(1   vm) :
In principle, we can determine the socially optimal tax rate which maximizes V , or Ui:
Ui() = log(1   vo()) + vo()m(log vo()   vo()) + ! log(vo()):
At this point we introduce the Laer-curve, which relates the tax revenue to the tax rate:
X() = vo():
It can be shown that the Laer-curve is increasing for low tax rates and decreases for high rates assuming m <
6 + 2
p
5  10:5, see Fig. 1.
Returning to the dynamics, note that after one step, the non-equilibrium path also becomes symmetric: vi;t = vt,
because everybody will have the same optimization problem. Dropping the index i,
F(vt 1; vt) =   1   vt + vt 1m
 
1
vt
  1
!
= 0:
The sucient condition of local asymptotic stability is jF0(vo)j < 1, where by implicit function theorem,
 = F0(vo) =
dvt
dvt 1
=  F
0
1
F02
:
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Figure 1: The Laer-curves under the social preferences approach for two dierent values of the tax morale parameter.
Here F01 and F
0
2 are the partial derivatives with respect to variables 1 and 2, respectively.
F01 = m
 
1
vo
  1
!
and F02 =
 
(1   vo)2 + m
1
vo
:
Thus, the local stability condition is
0 <  < m(1   vo)2:
The issue of global stability requires further analysis.
We performed numerical simulations by experimenting with the parameter pairs (m; ). First, we get rid of those
pairs which generate optimal reports below the minimum or above 1. For lower tax morale (m = 0:5), lower optimal
tax rate (around  = 0:25), for higher tax morale (m = 1), higher optimal tax rate (around  = 0:5) is obtained, see
Table 1. It is remarkable that for low as well as high tax morales, the Laer curve is already decreasing around the
optimum: for m = 0:5, raising the tax rate from 0:2 to 0:25, the tax revenue drops from 0:11 to 0:1; while for m = 1,
raising the tax rate from 0:45 to 0:5, the tax revenue drops from 0:198 to 0:191, while the welfare increases. It seems
paradoxical that the socially optimal report is a decreasing function of the exogenous tax morale.
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Table 1: The impact of morale and tax rate in model A.
Morale Tax Rate Report Tax paid Utility Expansion
m  v X U 
0.5 0.20 0.551 0.110 –2.639 –0.623
0.5 0.25 0.438 0.110 –2.604 –0.776
0.5 0.30 0.333 0.100 –2.647 –0.885
1.0 0.45 0.439 0.198 –2.396 –0.809
1.0 0.50 0.382 0.191 –2.381 –0.873
1.0 0.55 0.329 0.181 –2.384 –0.919
2.2. Model B: Limited Observation
We now replace the assumption of global observability by local observability. Let Ni be worker i’s neighborhood (the
index set of his neighbors), which is a small subset of the total index set N = f1; 2; : : : ; Ig. Let v¯i;t be the average report
of i’s neighborhood in time t:
v¯i;t =
P
j2Ni v j;t
jNij ;
where ni = jNij is the number of neighbors, a small number relative to I, and in a symmetric case independent of i
and ni  I. We assume that the system of neighborhoods is connected, i.e. any pair of individuals are connected by a
chain of neighbors. Moreover, there is an integer T , (T  I) that any pair is connected by a chain of length T .
Because of this generalization, we display several formulas again, in the general frame:
Ui0(vi;t) =  u0(1   vi;t) + z01(vi;t;mi; v¯i;t 1) = 0;
where z01 is the partial derivative of z with respect to the first variable.
In case of corner solution, either
vi;t = vm if Ui0(vm) =  u0(1   vm) + z01(vm;mi; v¯i;t 1) < 0;
or
vi;t = 1 if Ui0(1) =  u0(1   ) + z01(1;mi; v¯i;t 1) > 0:
The optimal report for interior optima is
  
1   vi;t + v¯i;t 1mi
 
1
vi;t
  1
!
= 0:
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We often assume that the model is symmetric, i.e. if the individuals’ indices are arbitrarily permuted, then the
neighborhoods are also permuted correspondingly. Specifically, for every i, jNij = n and mi = m.
For the time being, we consider the simplest case.
Example. The workers are located on a circle: with the convention I + 1 = 1 and 0 = I, let their neighbors be
Ni = fi   1; i + 1g. Then v¯i;t 1 = (vi 1;t 1 + vi+1;t 1)=2, at an equilibrium voi as in model A
To study local stability, we shall return to the general case, where the entries of the matrix of the linearized equation
vt = Avt 1 are as follows:
ai j =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
F0(vo)=ni if j 2 Ni;
0 otherwise:
Theorem 1. Under the stated assumptions, the symmetric equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable.
Proof. Due to symmetry, the row sums of A are uniformly equal to F0(vo). By the theory of Markov chains, the
underlying Markov system is ergodic, its dominant characteristic root is equal to 1. Hence the dominant characteristic
root of A is equal to F0(vo).
In a separate paper, Garay, Simonovits and Tth (2012) showed under quite general assumptions that the equilib-
rium is unique, symmetric and globally stable.
We can demonstrate by simulations that for symmetric initial states the dierence between models A and B
immediately disappears, though it survives for asymmetric initial states. The stability of model A also survives. We
select the pair m = 1 and  = 0:5 and analyze the dynamics of asymmetric initial states for three agents. Let x = 1:3,
v1;0 = xvo , v2;0 = vo and v1;0 = vo=x. It is sucient to display the first six state vectors to see the preservation of
stability, see Tab. 2.
Table 2: Tax reports in model B also stabilize.
Period Report 1 Report 2 Report 3
t v1 v2 v3
0 0.497 0.382 0.294
1 0.357 0.389 0.411
2 0.392 0.383 0.377
3 0.381 0.383 0.385
4 0.383 0.382 0.382
5 0.382 0.382 0.382
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3. The heuristics model
3.1. Overview
Alternatives to economics-style theories of human decision-making stress the role of simple heuristics and the
lack of integrated preferences. In this framework people have available a set of heuristics (decision rules), and a
mechanism for selecting a decision rule (see for instance Gigerenzer and Selten (2002)). In our model we assume the
existence of two working heuristics.
1. Pay taxes if you are satisfied with your lot, and do not pay if you are dissatisfied.
2. Pay taxes if most of your neighbors pay, and do not pay if most of them do not pay.
The first heuristic is based on a cue that is close to the concept of utility. Agents consume private goods and enjoy
the fruits of public good provision. These two sources of utility manifest themselves in a feeling of satisfaction or
dissatisfaction. We retain the traditional assumption of monotonicity, higher consumption of both private and public
goods makes it more likely that agents’ utility exceeds their satisfaction threshold. This property of the model has
close resemblance to the concept of satisficing (Simon (1956)). Agents are heterogeneous, in the sense that their
thresholds are dierent. For a given level of consumption some people are satisfied, while others are not. The cue of
the first heuristic can serve for detecting cheating by other members of the society, or by the government. When there
are many cheaters, dissatisfaction is one of the possible indicators of unsocial behavior by others.
The second heuristic is the well-established imitation heuristic adapted to our problem. Imitation seems to be a
general purpose heuristic, or a basic constituent of the human mind (see Meltzo (1988) who proposed the expression
“homo imitans” for our race). However, in the taxation context it can also be deemed as a way of detecting cheaters.
It relies on direct evidence on cheating, but this evidence is imperfect as one’s neighbors (i.e. people whose tax paying
behavior one can observe) are only a small sample of the whole population.
We believe that both heuristics are sensible, since both can be looked at as proxy mechanisms for detecting and
punishing non-cooperators, and it is dicult to see what other detection cues may exist. As a method of punishment
tax-cheating is not very eective, but the only way of retribution, short of beating up confirmed cheaters. Also this is
a sweet one, since utility – ceteris paribus – increases after stopping tax payment.
These two decision rules can be in conflict. In the traditional, preference based approach such a problem can-
not arise because – according to the parlance of the psychological literature – preferences are “integrated”. In our
framework we must postulate some conflict-resolving mechanism, a meta-heuristic. Of the possible reasonable meta-
heuristics we consider two:
1. Pay taxes whenever at least one (first-level) heuristic suggests tax-paying.
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2. Pay taxes only if both of the (first-level) heuristics suggest tax-paying.
Both meta-rules seem intuitively plausible, therefore we suppose that they are distributed in some proportion
across the population.
3.2. Specification
We construct a simple agent-based model to analyze the way local interactions foster or hinder the spreading of
tax evasion. There are I agents, having uniform real income (measured in terms of the private good) in each period t,
which is normalized to 1. The individual budget constraints are:
cit + vit = 1;
with cit denoting private consumption, and vit representing taxes paid. Agents have identical, linear utility functions.
uit = cit + !Xt;
where
Xt =
IP
i=1
vit
I
represents the service of the public good enjoyed by an agent. We report only results with linear utility, as outcomes
for logarithmic utility were qualitatively similar. The numerator is the amount of the public good financed by tax.
Parameter ! introduced to capture the eciency of the public sector. Thus if ! > 1, then public spending is ecient
and the socially optimal outcome would involve a maximal tax rate with full adherence to the taxpaying norm. On the
other hand if ! < 1, taxation is wasteful, and the social optimum would entail a zero tax rate.
Let 0 <  < 1 be the tax rate. The tax behavior of each agent is represented by a binary variable:
vit = 0;
if agent i does not pay taxes in period t, and
vit = ;
if he does.
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Each agent i is characterized by a real number ui giving his frustration threshold in terms of utility. We say that
an agent is “internally” frustrated in t if ui;t 1 < ui. Also, each agent i has a neighborhood Ni  N, interpreted as the
set of acquaintances whose behavior is observable by i. Agents observe their neighbor’s decisions. Let mi;t represent
the share of tax evaders among agent i ’s acquaintances. Then, this agent is “externally” frustrated in t if mi;t 1 > 0:5.
The two cues of internal and external frustration nail down the heuristics mentioned above.
Tax behavior, is, in the end, determined through one of the meta-rules. If agent i is following the first meta-rule –
pay taxes if any of the heuristics suggest so – we will say that he is a default taxpayer.
vit =
8>>>><>>>>:
 if ui;t 1  u¯i or mi;t 1 < 0:5;
0 otherwise.
For an agent following the second meta-rule, we say that he is a default cheater.
vit =
8>>>><>>>>:
 if ui;t 1  u¯i and mi;t 1 < 0:5;
0 otherwise.
Variable vit is also the (partly) public state of agent i in period t, inasmuch as those people whose neighborhoods
include i can observe it. The agent characteristic (u¯i) is time invariant, and non-observable. To diminish the signifi-
cance of the initial pattern of tax compliance, we also introduced ”noise” in the system. That is, each period agents
with a fixed probability switch from tax evasion to compliance or vice-versa, making random “mistakes”.
Next we present the skeleton of the algorithm used to run the simulations.3 Then, we describe the choice of
parameters for the runs, and finally, we present our main results.
1. Create I agents, s0 of whom are default cheaters; they will start by cheating in the first round.
2. Assign satisfaction levels ui to agents according to a normal distribution with mean of u and standard deviation
of u.
3. Determine the neighborhoods of the agents, Ni  N, depending on parameter d.
4. Calculate the amount of public goods (X) according to the tax behavior of each agent, the tax rate  and public
eciency !.
5. Specify the utilities (ui;t) of agents, by adding their utility gained from private and public consumption.
6. Start a new period, let t = t + 1.
7. Update the strategies vi;t of agents.
3The algorithm was implemented in the NetLogo language.
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8. Apply noise to the agents’ strategies.
9. Iterate on 5, 6, 7 and 8 until the system becomes stationary.
We shortly discuss the chosen range of values for these variables and their interpretations below.
1. The number of agents was I = 1000 for each run. The share of default cheaters s0 was varied from 0 to 1.
2. The mean of satisfaction levels u was set between 0:5 and 1:5. A lower value represents a “richer” society
where the ratio of income to consumer desires is high. The standard deviation u could take on three possible
values: 0, 0:25 and 0:5, the first value inducing a limit scenario where every agent had identical aspiration level.
3. Agents were located on a circle. The previous and next d 2 f1; 2; : : : ; 10g agents were considered parts of their
neighborhood; agents could observe whether these were tax avoiders or payers this period. This parameter at-
tempts to capture social proximity. Higher social proximity implies that agents have access to more information,
a larger sample of the total population concerning tax behavior.
4. The tax rate was changed between 0% and 100% in steps of 5%. Public eciency ! was chosen to be very low
(0:4), low (0:7), average (1), high (1:3) or very high (1:6).
6. We ran the simulations until the share of tax evaders stabilized. The time frame of t = 300 periods proved to be
sucient for reaching a stochastically stationary state for all parameter combinations.
8. We fixed the noise parameter at 1%.
3.3. Results
In total, 173; 250 runs were executed, covering all parameter combinations. The variable of principal interest was
the share of tax evaders in the final population, defined as the the average share of tax evaders in the population in the
last 50 periods.
Since being a default cheater or default taxpayer does not change over time, and this property of our agents is
crucial in determining their tax behavior, the correlation between the share of default cheaters and the average share
of tax evasion in the steady state is very high at 0:8. This implies that most of the variance in the final share of cheaters
can be explained by the share of default cheaters. Moreover, a linear estimate of the eect of default cheaters gives
a slope prameter of 1:07, which is not significantly dierent from 1 (p < 0:01). Therefore, we decided to focus our
investigation on the relationship between our parameters (satisfaction levels, social proximity, the tax rate and public
eciency) and the dierence between the final share of cheaters and default cheaters. We will dub the latter as “bias
in evasion” and quote it in percentage points. Note that a positive value for this variable means that the frequency of
tax evasion in the long run is higher than its share in the initial state. The average bias in evasion across all runs was
slightly negative,  5:9.
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Figure 2: The eect of the tax rate on bias in evasion.
Partial and cross eects. Satisfaction levels had a linear eect on the bias in evasion. Based on a linear estimate, a rise
of 0:1 in average satisfaction levels increased bias in evasion by 3:8 percentage points. Unsurprisingly, societies that
are “rich” (compared to the desires of their citizens) have an easier time in dealing with tax evasion: for a satisfaction
level of 0:5, average bias in evasion is  25. However, with a very high share of default tax evaders (> 80%), the
problem of tax evasion might still be persistent. We have also found that uniformity in desire helps dealing with
evasion; smaller standard deviatons of satisfaction levels lead to lower bias in evasion.
Neighborhood size also has a monotonic, but non-linear relationship on bias in evasion. With d = 1, i.e. everybody
has only two neighbors, bias in evasion is  16, whereas with d = 10 it increases to  2. Contrary to intuition, when
social relations are intense, tax evasion is much more dicult to get rid of. It should be mentioned that cohesion has
diminishing returns as far as change in evasion is concerned.
Public eciency is again in a linear relationship with evasion. An average increase of 0:1 increases decreases
biase in evasion by 0:8. This is a small eect compared to those of satisfaction levels and social cohesion.
Finally, the tax rate is in a complex relationship with the bias in evasion, see Fig. 2. Changing the tax rate from
5% to 25% might even be beneficial for tax evasion; and there are other intervals ([45%; 55%] and [85%; 100%]) on
which the average eect of the tax rate is extremely small.
We find that average satisfaction levels, neighborhood size and public eciency do not interact. On the other
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Figure 3: The relationship between the tax rate and bias in evasion for various values of social eciency.
hand, low tax rate helps reduce evasion when satisfaction levels are low, and increases it when they are high. A
plausible reason for this eect is that high satisfaction levels also imply that the private procurement of goods could
well be inadequate, so a “poor” society needs more governmental spending (and thus higher taxes) to make taxpayers
suciently satisfied.
A similar interaction emerges between social eciency and the tax rate: a low tax rate is best (in terms of tax
evasion) for low social eciency (Fig. 3). With social eciency increasing above unity, higher tax rates become more
attractive. The dierential eect increases gradually until a tax rate of 0:7, and changes very little afterwards.
An interesting property of our simulations is that certain agents have mixing behavior, whereby they switch from
paying taxes to tax evasion every other turn. Imagine a default cheater is in a taxpayers dominated environment. He
pays his taxes one turn, but this may sent him below his utility threshold, As he finds himself unhappy he turns to
tax evasion. But suppose that by evading tax, he is now again over his utility threshold; and since his environment
contains mostly taxpayers, the combination of external and the internal heuristics now induce him to pay his taxes
again. A similar story can be told of some default taxpayers in a neighborhood of tax evaders. Overall, the share
of agents with such mixing behavior is small but nonnegligable: over all runs, their share in the population is 7:9%.
The behavior of these ,,marginal” agents is sensitive to changes in satisfaction levels and social eciency, since such
eects might push their utility permanently over or under their thresholds. However, increasing the tax rate does not
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Figure 4: The Laer-curve under the heuristics approach.
necessarily alter mixing behavior. To see this, suppose that at a certain tax rate an agent is a switcher. Disregarding
the rise in the level of the public good, increasing the tax rate will make a switcher even more dissatisfied when he
pays taxes, but in these periods he was dissatisfied anyway. Obviously, in the periods when a switcher does not pay
taxes, he is not aected by the tax rate except indirectly, through the public good provided by others paying their
taxes. Therefore, any impact of the tax rate on switchers can only come through the public good.
Laer-curves. We now turn to inspecting Laer-curves (i.e the relationship between the tax rate and tax revenues)
within our model. Although, as we have seen, the relationship between bias in evasion and the tax rate is positive,
this eect is not strong enough to oset the higher tax rate eect. Therefore, as Fig. 4 shows, tax revenue increases
monotonically with the tax rate, and the relationship is very close to linear. This eect is qualitatively replicated when
fixing one or more of the parameters analyzed above. Lower average satisfaction levels, higher social uniformity,
weaker social cohesion and greater eciency all lead to steeper, but nonetheless approximately linear Laer-curves.
This result stands in sharp contrast with that of the social preferences model. We interpret it as a possible discrim-
inating feature: optimizing behavior even with social preferences can produce too high tax rates, i.e too high from the
point of view of government revenue, whereas non-optimizers with ”unselfish” motives may sacrifice themselves by
paying taxes even at very high rates.
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4. Conclusion
This paper analyzed taxation models without audits and fines, neglecting wage dierences, and assuming that
taxes finance only the provision of public goods. We focused on the dierences between two modeling approaches:
the social preferences and the heuristics views, each taking for granted that humans possess conditionally altruistic
motives. However, they dier in the way the behaviour stemming from these motives is formalized. Is this dierence
essential or just a matter of taste?
In the social preferences models we encounter the traditionally shaped Laer-curve, tax revenue first increases
then decreases as the tax rate rises. On the other hand, in the heuristics models we meet (linearly) increasing Laer-
curves. We discover agents with a strange behavioral pattern; these ”marginal” agents use mixed strategies over time,
alternating between paying and avoiding taxes, as if they regretted each action the instant they performed it. Though
even in this model higher tax rates induce more evasion the relationship is linear due to the smoothing eect of regretful
agents. Thus in the heuristics models with non-optimizing agents tax rates are never ”too high”. This conclusion is
valid even with low social eciency, which would mean that non-optimizing agents can be remorselessly exploited
by inecient or malevolent governments.
Thus, the two modeling approaches seem to be essentially dierent, leading to antithetic conclusions. How to test
the two theories against each other remains an open question.
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